Rudolf Vetschera (presenting author), University of Vienna (based on joint work with Luis Dias, Coimbra and Pascale Zaraté, Toulouse)
Abstract:
Existing (game theoretic) models of bargaining do not capture the typical dynamics of negotiation processes. Axiomatic models typically only provide characteristics of (desirable) bargaining outcomes, but do not specify a path on which these outcomes can be reached. Strategic models assuming perfectly rational players lead to the prediction that one player will start the process by proposing the equilibrium outcome, which will immediately be accepted by the other player. For a more realistic model of the bargaining process, we therefore need to develop models that take into account that payers are not able to immediately calculate equilibrium solutions or to predict the effects of bargaining steps they make. We present an analytical model based on this framework which emphasizes the role of expectations about the eventual outcome. We then provide empirical evidence on the validity of this model in the context of electronic negotiation experiments and show how the model could be used to provide recommendations to negotiators about their behavior.
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June 9th, 2022,
12 AM to 12.40 PM (UK GMT-1)
1 PM; to 1.40 PM (CET, Berlin)
https://us02web.zoom.us/j/86938010226?pwd=MFliaGFRdFhZVGZkeHdyV3VTY2l4Zz09
Meeting-ID: 869 3801 0226
Code: 017710