402. Technological and Market Response to the Environmental Tax by a Competitive Industry
Invited abstract in session HD-22: Applications of Game Theory in Operations Management , cluster Game Theory and Operations Management.
Thursday, 14:15-15:45Room: FENH202
Authors (first author is the speaker)
| 1. | Anton Ovchinnikov
|
| School of Business, Queen's University | |
| 2. | Dmitry Krass
|
| Rotman School of Mgmt, University of Toronto |
Abstract
We consider a response to environmental taxes by firms producing a commodity good with a polluting by-product; the firms are heterogeneous with respect to production efficiency and pollution control technology. Cournot competition is assumed, with two demand functions: iso-elastic and linear. In this setting, we consider a market response, where firms choose production quantities given their technology choices, and a technology response, where firms also choose among a discrete set of available technologies. We characterize the equilibria and examine using environmental taxes to incentivize “green” technology choices; results may qualitatively differ depending on the demand function assumed.
Keywords
- Environmental Management
- Game Theory
- Sustainable Development
Status: accepted
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